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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALBERTSON'S, INC., 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
HONORABLE ROBERT B. HANSEN, 
Attorney General of the State 
of Utah, and HONORABLE R. PAUL 
VAN DA.M, County Attorney of 
Salt Lake County, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 15775 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case. This is an action by Albert-
son's, Inc. (hereinafter "Albertson's") against Honorable 
Robert B. Hansen, Attorney General of Utah, and Honorable R. 
Paul Van Darn, County Attorney of Salt Lake County, seeking 
declaratory judgment that its retail sales promotion known 
as "Double Cash Bingo" is not subject to prosectuion as 
"gambling" or a "lottery" within the terms of Title 76, Chap-
ter 10, Part 11, Utah Code Annotated (1977 Supplement). 
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2. Disposition of the Case Below. This action was 
commenced by plaintiff's filing a complaint and, later, an 
amended complaint for declaratory judgment. Defendant Van 
Darn filed a motion to dismiss (presenting matters outside 
the pleadings, thus converting the motion to dismiss into a 
motion for summary judgment). R. 44. Defendant Hansen also 
filed a motion to dismiss. R. 59. Plaintiff filed a motion 
for summary judgment that "it is not subject to prosecution 
for violation of the Utah Penal Code for conducting Double 
Cash Bingo." R. 95. There was no dispute among the parties 
as to any material fact. On April 4, 1978, after a hearing 
on the cross-motions, the District Court entered judgment 
dismissing plaintiff's action and denying plaintiff's motion 
for summary judgment. R. 149-150. 
3. Relief Sought on Appeal. Plaintiff seeks reversal 
of the District Court's judgment and direction that the Dis-
trict Court enter the judgment sought by its motion below. 
4. The Proceedings Below. 
A. The Events Leading to the Action's Com-
mencement. For several weeks prior to March 3, 
1978, Albertson's conducted a retail sales pro-
motion known as "Double Cash Bingo" in its var-
ious stores throughout the State of Utah and in 
ten other states, without complaint from any law 
enforcement authorities. R. 98. "Double Cash 
-2-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Bingo" was a game in which the player received 
a "bingo"-type card and a disc containing num-
bers under opaque covers. The player uncovered 
the numbers on the disc; if those numbers cre-
ated a winning "bingo" pattern, the player re-
ceived a designated cash prize. Any member of 
the public could participate in the game, simply 
by asking for a card at any Albertson's store. A 
player was not required to make any payment or to 
transact any business with Albertson's. Ibid. 
Garnes such as "Double Cash Bingo" are an ac-
cepted form of sales promotion in the retail in-
dustry throughout the United States, just as are 
trading stamps and other techniques. The spon-
soring stores derive no revenue from the games, 
but use them as a means of generating corporate 
goodwill. R. 98, 100-101. 
On March 2, 1978, defendant Van Darn threatened 
Albertson's and its employees with criminal prose-
cution, pursuant to his interpretation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Part 11, Utah Code Annotated (UTAH 
CODE ANN. §76-10-1101, et seq. (1977 Supp.), here-
inafter sometimes "Part 11"), if "Double Cash 
Bingo" was not discontinued immediately. R. 96. 
Solely because of that threat, Albertson's 
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discontinued the game on March 3 and has lost 
substantial sales and goodwill as a result. R. 
98-99. 
Albertson's believes that "Double Cash 
Bingo" is not unlawful and wishes to resume the 
game. It brought the present action, pursuant 
to the terms of UTAH CODE ANN. §78-33-2 (1977 
Repl. Vol.), as one whose rights are affected by 
a statute, to have the statute's construction and 
validity determined and to obtain a declaration 
of its rights thereunder. 
B. The Statutes. Prior to 1973, gambling-
type activities were governed by Title 76, Chap-
ter 27 of the Utah Code Annotated (UTAH CODE ANN. 
§76-27-1, et seq. (1953)). That Chapter, en-
titled "Gaming", prohibited two discrete classes 
of unlawful conduct--"game[s] of faro, monte, rou-
lette, lansquenet, rouge et noir, rondo" and sim-
ilar games (UTAH CODE ANN. §76-27-1 (1953)) and 
similar games (UTAH CODE ANN. §76-27-1 (1953)) 
and "lotteries" (UTAH CODE ANN. §76-27-9 (1953)). 
Conducting a prohibited game was a felony, re-
gardless of whether the player wagered or risked 
anything of value on the outcome. UTAH CODE 
ANN. §76-27-1 (1953)). Neither a game played for 
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money nor a lottery could be exempted from for-
mer Chapter 27's scope on the ground that it 
was a lawful business transaction or for any 
other reason. 
In 1973, the Legislature, by enacting Part 11, 
coopletely overhauled the State's gambling stat-
utes. Rather than continuing separate offenses of 
"gaming" and "lotteries", the new statute created 
a single misdemeanor, known as "gambling" (as well 
as other offenses known as "gambling fraud" and 
"gambling promotion"). UTAH CODE ANN. §§76-10-1102 
through 1104 (1977 Supp.). 
Part 11, entitled "Gambling", differs from its 
predecessor in the following particulars: 
(1) It prohibits "gambling" (which in-
eludes "lotteries"), which is defined as 
risking anything of value for a return 
or risking anything of value on the out-
come of a contest, game, [etc.] ... when 
the return or outcome is based upon an 
element of chance and is in accord with 
an agreement or understanding that some-
one will receive something of value in 
the event of a certain outcome, and gam-
bling includes a lottery ... 
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1101(1). The former 
statute prohibited all "games", regardless 
of whether the player risked anything of 
value (UTAH CODE ANN. §76-27-1 (1953)) and 
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prohibited all "lotteries" in which the 
player "paid ... any valuable considera-
tion for [his] chance . . . UTAH CODE 
ANN. §76-27-9 (1953); 
(2) It exempts "lawful business 
transaction[s]" from its prohibitions, 
even if those transactions otherwise 
would constitute "gambling" or "lotteries". 
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-llOl(l)(a) (1977 
Supp.). The former statute contained no 
exemptions; and 
(3) It limits the term "value" 
(as in "anything of value" or "valuable 
consideration") to discernible monetary 
value. UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1101(3). 
The former statute contained no such lim-
itation. 
The Legislature undertook a substantial reworking 
of Utah's gambling legislation in its drafting of 
Part 11. It is well established that a legisla-
ture, in enacting substantial changes in a statute, 
is deemed to have intended to change, rather than 
re-enact, prior existing law. Roy L. Houck & Sons 
v. Ellis, 229 Or. 21, 336 P.2d 166, 171 (1961) 
-6-
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("Ordinarily, any substantial change in the phrase-
ology of a statutory provision indicates an inten-
tion on the legislature's part to change the mean-
ing of such provision ... "); Trump v. Badet, 84 
Ariz. 319, 327 P.2d 1001, 1005 (1958) ("[I]t is 
presumed that the legislature by amending a stat-
ute intends to make a change in existing law"); 
Meenen v. Meenen, 180 Kan. 779, 308 P.2d 158, 163 
(1957) ("A change in phraseology ... of the origi-
nal act, raises a presumption that a change in mean-
ing was also intended ... "). Part 11 merges the 
two fonnerly distinct offenses of "gaming" and 
"lottery" into the single offense of "gambling", 
creates a category of transactions which, although 
they otherwise would be prohibited as "gambling" 
by the statute's terms (and were prohibited by the 
prior statute), are exempt from its prohibition, 
and limits "value", a theretofore unlimited term, 
to items of discernible monetary value. 
Part 11 has not been construed by this Court. 1 
1Geis v. Continental Oil Co., 29 Utah 2d 452, 511 P.2d 
725 (1973), which was relied upon by defendants in their mo-
tions below, was decided on June 22, 1973--after the adjourn-
ment of the 1973 session of the Legislature but before Part 
ll's effective date of June 30, 1973. It did not construe, 
nor even refer to, the new statute. The Court's forebear-
ance was proper, of course, A statute enacted after the 
transactions leading to the Geis suit could not affect its 
-7-
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Although it is a criminal statute, Part 11 is 
unclear in a vital particular. While §1101(1) 
defines "gambling" as "risking anything of value 
for a return or ... upon the outcome of a con-
test, game, [etc.] ... when the return or out-
come is based upon an element of chance", it does 
not define, nor provide any guidelines for defin-
ing, an "element of chance"--even though the stat-
ute, taken literally, would prohibit every trans-
action in human history. 
C. Defendants' Motions. Both defendants 
based their motions substantially on the decision 
of Geis v. Continental Oil Co., 29 Utah 2d 452, 
511 P.2d 725 (1973). 
Defendant Van Darn asserted that "the issues 
raised by Plaintiff's Amended Complaint are re-
solved by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
in ... Geis v. Continental Oil Co." and that, ac-
cording to the Geis decision--as defendant read 
outcome. UTAH CODE ANN. §§68-2-8,9 (1967 Repl. Vol.) The 
Legislature may not be deemed to have adopted Geis' later 
construction of the former statute--if Geis may-be consid-
ered to have construed the former statute at all--in its 
drafing of Part 11. Cf., District of Columbia v. Johnson & 
Wimsatt, Inc., 160 F.ZcI 913, 914-915 (D.C. Cir. 1947), ~ 
denied, 332 U.S. 760 (1947); Ward v. Northern Ohio Tel. Co., 
251 F. Supp. 606, 608-609 (N.D. Ohio 1966), aff'd per curiam, 
381 F.2d 516 (6th Cir. 1967). 
-8-
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it--a "player's time, attention, thought, energy 
and money spent in transportation to the store 
for a chance to win a prize" in Double Cash Bingo 
render the game unlawful gambling. R. 45. 
Defendant Hansen similarly asserted, appar-
ently in reliance upon Geis: 
The game in question contains the ele-
ments of (1) prizes, ... (2) chance, ... 
and (3) consideration, because participants 
must spend time, attention, thought, energy 
and transportation to the Plaintiff's busi-
ness location. It is also submitted that 
once the participants get to the store that 
participant, more than likely, purchases 
some items, thereby expending money. ' 
Once the elements of lottery are pres-
ent, the game cannot be considered a lawful 
business transaction because it is an illegal 
operation contrary to the Utah Constitution 
and other Utah statutes. 
R. 64-65. 
Neither defendant addressed the terms of the 
present gambling statute--even though it must be 
presumed that the Legislature, in making substan-
tial changes in the gambling statute, intended to 
change the existing law--nor attempted to determine 
what in Geis was holding and what was dictum. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY ENTERED JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS AND DENIED PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
-9-
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I. 
"DOUBLE CASH BINGO" IS NOT UNLAWFUL UNDER THE 
TERMS OF UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1101, ET SEQ. 
(1977 SUPP.) 
1. Participants in Double Cash Bingo did not risk "any-
thing of value", nor give "valuable consideration" as a 
condition of receiving a prize or return. 
A game constitutes "gambling" or a "lottery" under the 
terms of Part 11 only if it requires a risk of "anything of 
value" or payment (or promise) of "valuable consideration" by 
the players. UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1101(1) ,(2) (1977 Supp.). 
Participants in Double Cash Bingo were not required to spend 
any money, make any purchase or pay, promise or risk anything 
else, which in ordinary understanding could be considered 
"valuable", as a term or condition of playing the game. 2 
2Indeed, the Bingo players' investment was indistin-
guishable from that of participants in the lottery for National 
Collegiate Athletic Association tickets which also was the 
subject of recent threats by the Salt Lake County Attorney. 
In that case, the Attorney General, in an opinion letter to 
the President of the University of Utah, stated: 
[I)t is clear that no criminal lottery is 
involved because the third essential element, "val-
uable consideration," is nonexistent. Applicants 
pay no money to NCAA for the chance to buy tickets. 
Unless one considers the cost of the postage stamp, 
cost of the envelope, and any minimal interest lost 
on the check or money order during the few days re-
quired to process the applications, there is no 
cost at all to the applicant. Presumably a minimal 
amount of time, attention, thought and energy are 
involved. 
-10-
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"Gambling" is defined at UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1101(1) 
(1977 Supp.) as "risking anything of value" on the outcome 
of a game or other event; "lottery" is defined at §76-10-1101 
(2) as payment of, or promise to pay, "valuable consideration" 
in return for a chance. Neither Subsection (1) nor (2) de-
fines "value". However, §76-10-1101(3) provides: 
"Gambling bet" means money, checks, credit, or 
any other representation of value. 
Application of the canon of ejusdem generis, which is mandated 
by this Court in such situations, limits "value" as used in 
Subsection (3), to discernible monetary value--the kind of 
value which money, checks and credit represent. This Court 
has held: 
[W]hen general terms are used following express 
ones the general must be understood in the light 
of and as characterized by the specific and 
limited to things of like kind. 
Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures Corp., 2 Utah 2d 256, 265, 
272 P.2d 177 (1954). Accord, Townsend v. Board of Review, 27 
Utah 2d 94, 96, 493 P.2d 614 (1972) ("[W]hen general words or 
terms follow specific ones, the general must be understood as 
applying to things of the same kind as the specific"); Stone 
v. Salt Lake City, 11 Utah 2d 196, 204, 356 P.2d 631 (1960). 
Attorne General's 0 inion Letter to President David P. Gard-
ner, March 9, 1978, pp. 2- . (The Attorney General, in t is 
matter, has not attempted to explain why he considers an 
NCAA lottery participant's time, attention, thought and energy 
to be "minimal" but an Albertson's game player's time, atten-
tion, thought and energy not to be.) 
-11-
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The rule should be applied with particular stringency in 
construing criminal statutes. People v. Thomas, 25 Cal. 2d 
880, 156 P.2d 7, 17 (1945). Obviously, the act of walking 
into a grocery store--even at the risk of being tempted to 
buy something--or the "time, attention, thought and energy" 
required to fill out a bingo card could not constitute 
"value" for purposes of Subsection (3). 
The Legislature, in enacting Part 11, intended to 
create new law. In defining "gambling bets" in Section 
1101(3)--which had no predecessor in the prior statute--it 
clearly limited "value" to the kind of discernible monetary 
value which money, checks and credit represent. It must be 
presumed that it intended "value" to be similarly limited 
when, in describing gambling risks, it used the term "any-
thing of value" in Subsection (1)--which also was a completely 
new provision--and "valuable consideration" in Subsection (2).1 
It is a rule of Utah statutory construction that 
3The above definition of "value", "anything of value" 
and "valuable consideration" is consistent with the Penal 
Code's definition of "anything of value" at UTAH CODE ANN. 
§76-6-401 (1977 Supp.) as: 
... real estate, tangible and intangible personal 
property, captured or domestic animals and birds, 
written instruments and other writings represent-
ing or embodying rights ... or otherwise contain-
ing anything of value to the owner, commodities of 
a public utility nature ... and trade secrets ... 
-12-
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... presumptively when [a] term ... is used more 
than once in the same statute, unless manifest 
differences require a different meaning to be at-
tached, the words carry the same meaning. 
Bishop v. Parker, 103 Utah 145, 150, 134 P.2d 180 (1943). 
Accord, Rosemary Properties, Inc. v. Mccolgan, 29 Cal. 2d 
677, 177 P. 2d 757, 763 (1947) ("The legislature could not 
have intended to use a significant word in two different 
senses in the same statute"); Corey v. Knight, 150 Cal. App. 
2d 671, 310 P.2d 673, 679 (1957); DeGrief v. City of Seattle, 
50 Wash. 2d 1, 297 P.2d 940, 946 (1956) ("' [IJ]hen similar 
words are used in different parts of a statute, the meaning 
is presumed to be the same throughout'"). 
Construed by the required canons of interpretation, 
Part 11 limits "gambling" and "lotteries" to those games 
which involve a risk of items of discernible monetary value, 
which construction, by the way, is consistent with the clear 
majority rule defining those terms. ~·, State ex rel. 
Stafford v. Fox-Great Falls Theatre Corp., 114 !font. 52, 132 
P.2d 689, 696-697 (1942) ("We cannot, therefore, construe 
the words 'to pay any valuable consideration for the chance' 
as meaning to suffer such slight detriment as that necessary 
to participate in the drawing ... ");People v. Cardas, 137 
Cal. App. Supp. 788, 28 P.2d 99, 101 (1933) ("The fact that 
such cards or chances were given away to induce persons to 
visit their store with the expectation that they might 
-13-
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purchase goods, and thereby increase their trade, is a bene-
fit too remote to constitute a consideration for the chances"); 
Goodwill Adv. Co. v. Elmwood Amusement Corp., 86 R.I. 6, 133 
A. 2d 644, 647-648 (1957); Darlington Theatres, Inc. v. Coker, 190 
S.C. 282, 2 S.E.2d 782, 786-788 (1939); Affiliated Enterprises 
Inc. v. Rock-Ola Mfg. Corp., 23 F. Supp. 3, 6-7 (N. D. Ill. 
1937). 
2. Double Cash Bingo is exempt from Part ll's prohibi-
tion on the sround that it is a lawful business transaction. 
The term "gambling" (which includes "lottery"), contained 
in UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1101(1) (1977 Supp.), does not in-
elude "lawful business transaction [ s]", which otherwise would 
constitute gambling. UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1101(1) (a) (1977 
Supp.). That term is not defined by the statute and, being 
an exemption from a criminal statute, it must be construed in 
favor of a transaction's legitimacy. Utah law requires that 
exceptions in penal statutes ought to be lib-
erally construed in favor of him who is charged 
with the violation of the provisions of the 
statute. 
Schuyler v. Southern Pac. Co., 37 Utah 581, 606, 109 Pac. 458 
(1909), aff'd, 227 U.S. 601 (1913). The canon of inter-
pretation required by Schuyler is buttressed by the re-
quirement of UTAH CODE ANN. §76-1-104 (1977 Supp.) that 
[t]he provisions of [the Penal Code] shall be 
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(2) Define adequately conduct and mental 
state which constitute each offense and safe-
guard conduct that is without fault from con-
demnation as criminal. 
Double Cash Bingo is solely a retail sales promotion. 
Albertson's derives no revenue whatever from the game. R. 98. 
It is undisputed that games of type are an accepted form of 
sales promotion in the retail food industry, which is used 
throughout the United States. R. 100-101. 
Double Cash Bingo manifests none of the vices normally 
associated with "gambling": the inducement of persons to 
squander their resources on wagers, a commerce in wagers, the 
frequently unscrupulous collection methods associated with 
gambling and the alleged tendency of gambling to become an 
adjunct to other antisocial activities, such as prostitution 
or narcotics. As the court noted in Affiliated Enterprises, 
Inc. v. Rock-Ola Mfg. Corp., supra at 6: 
The general purpose of the lottery statutes 
is to prevent members of the public from being 
cheated and defrauded of their money in return for 
something which may or may not be of greater 
value than the sum which they have invested ... 
" ... [The subject promotion] did not present a lot-
tery scheme, because a lottery involves a scheme 
for raising money by selling chances to share in 
the distribution of prizes . . . . Thus the con-
clusion must be that there was no special intent 
to cheat or induce members of the public into buy-
ing something, or paying something for a chance. 
Instead ... there was a general intent and general 
purpose to present something ... which would catch 
the public eye and increase the circulation of the 
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~aper. We view this ... [as a device for] increas-
in the circulation of the ublication, rather than 
as a deliberate scheme to wron members o the ub-
lic. Emphasis added. 
(Citing Post Publ. Co. v. Murray, 230 Fed. 773, 776 (1st Cir. 
1916).) Similarly, in People v. Cardas, supra, 28 P.2d at 
101, the court held: 
"The gratuitous distribution of property by 
lot or chance ... does not constitute the offense. 
In such case, the person receiving the chance is 
not induced to hazard money with the hope of ob-
taining a larger value, or to part with his money 
at all; and the spirit of gambling is not culti-
vated or stimulated, which is the essential evil 
of lotteries ... which our statute is designed 
to prevent " 
(Citing Cross v. People, 18 Colo. 321, 32 Pac. 821, 822 
(1896).) 
The County Attorney urged below that the sole purpose 
of the lawful business transaction exemption is "obviously 
to remove from the operation of the criminal code, chancy 
business transactions such as stock purchases, real estate 
speculation and the like" (R. 46), but offered no authority 
whatever for that assertion. Indeed, it has been so univer-
sally recognized that commercial speculation is not gambling 
(~., Damler v. Baine, 114 Ind. App. 534, 51 N.E.2d 885, 888 
(1943); Dillaway v. Alden, 88 Me. 230, 33 Atl. 981, 982 
(1895)), that such an exemption would have been superfluous 
by 1973, especially since the Code had done without one in 
prior years. Further Part 11 limits "gambling" to "risking 
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anything of value upon the outcome of a contest, game, gam-
ing scheme or gaminf, device". "Chancy business transactions" 
such as real estate purchases are not risks based upon the 
outcome of games or contests. The Legislature simply could 
not have conceived them to be potentially within §1101(1) 's 
scope; therefore it would have had no reason to exempt them. 
The County Attorney has urged, in effect, that §1101(1) (a) is a 
superfluous and unnecessary act; the accepted canons reject 
such a construction. E.g., Roza Irr. Dist. v. State, 80 
Wash. 2d 633, 497 P.2d 166, 171 (1972); Stafford v. Realty 
Bond Ser,. Corp., 39 Cal. 797, 249 P.2d 241, 245 (1952). 
Subsection (l)(a) 's exemption of lawful business 
transactions must be construed to favor legitimacy. Further, 
it must be construed as a meaningful, rather than superflu-
ous, act. It would have been an idle gesture for the Legis-
lature in 1973 to "exempt", for the first time, transactions 
which never had been challenged under prior Utah gambling 
statutes or ordinances and which for so long had been accepted 
throughout the nation as being distinct from gambling. The only 
plausible construction of the subsection is that it was in-
tended to exempt those promotional transactions--even if they 
involve a payment of some small consideration (which Double 
Cash Bingo did not) and otherwise would have been "gambling" 
or "lotteries"--which are incidents of an accepted business 
and are not susceptible to the vices frequently associated 
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with either organized or "street" gambling. Double Cash 
Bingo--like the promotions held legal in Affiliated Enter-
prises, Cardas and other cases--does not "cultivate ... the 
essential evil" which Part 11 is intended to prohibit and, 
in fact, has no reason for existence other than the stimula-
tion of a useful and lawful business. 
3. Double Cash Bingo is not in violation of the Utah 
Penal Code by reason of the Geis decision. 
A. Geis did not state a rule of law applic-
able to this case. Defendants' claim of Double 
Cash Bingo's criminality at the District Court 
consisted of two points: that such a finding is 
required by the Utah Supreme Court's decision in 
Geis v. Continental Oil Co., supra, and Article 
VI, Section 28 of the Utah Constitution. R. 45-
46, 62-64. Defendants urged below that Geis re-
quires a finding that a player's "expenditure" 
of mere "time, attention, thought, energy and 
[possibly] money spent in transportation" to Al-
bertson's made Double Cash Bingo an unlawful 
lottery. R. 45. 
The short answer to a reliance upon Geis, 
quite simply, is that the statute under which 
that case was decided--UTAH CODE ANN. §76-27-1, 
et seq. (1953)--has been superseded by Part 11, 
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which defines "value" as discernible IDonetary 
value and which exempts lawful business enter-
prises from its prohibition. The earlier stat-
ute did not contain those provisions. Geis is 
not applicable to the present statute. 
Geis further did not hold, as was suggested 
in the proceedings below, that participation in a 
free game was sufficient consideration to render 
the game unlawful. It simply held that plain-
tiffs could not recover on what they themselves 
had alleged to be a contract based upon unlawful 
consideration. The question of whether a valuable 
consideration actually existed neither was raised 
nor argued by either party to that appeal. 
The facts of the Geis case were these: Mr. 
and Mrs. Ed Geis had participated in a promo-
tional game sponsored by Continental Oil Com-
pany ("Conoco") which was similar to Double Cash 
Bingo. Mrs. Geis presented what she alleged 
was a winning card to Conoco and claimed entitle-
ment to a $1,000.00 prize. Conoco, believing the 
card to have been altered, refused to pay the 
prize. Mrs. Geis sued Conoco, alleging that a con-
tract existed between her and the company by which 
Conoco was required to pay $1,000.00 upon her 
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presentation of a winning card. Conoco did not 
deny the existence of a contract; it simply 
claimed that Mrs. Geis, in altering her card, 
had failed to comply with the contract's terms. 
29 Utah 2d at 453-454; Record on Appeal No. 13049 
in the Utah Supreme Court, po. 1-4. 
The case was tried to a jury, which found 
that Mrs. Geis had not altered the card and found 
for her on the contract. Conoco appealed, assert-
ing that the jury verdict was plainly contrary to 
the overwhelming weight of the evidence. 29 Utah 
2d at 452-454. This Court reversed the judgment 
below, noting that Mrs. Geis, by the very allega-
tions of her complaint, had alleged an unlawful 
contract. The majority opinion held: 
... (T]his court would be engaging in 
some type of sophistry to hold that there 
was consideration present to support a bar-
gain but not to provide the element of con-
sideration to constitute a lottery. 
Since plaintiffs cannot establish their 
claim independent of a transaction prohib-
ited by law, the courts cannot grant them 
relief. 
Id. at 456. The Court did not find that the Geises 
had given Conoco valuable consideration; it simply 
recognized that they had painted themselves into a 
corner. The had no right of recovery against Conoco 
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unless they were parties to a contract with it; 
they could not be parties to a contract unless 
they had given Conoco valuable consideration. 
If they had given Conoco valuable consideration, 
they had engaged in an unlawful lottery under 
the terms of UTAH CODE ANN. §76-27-9 (1953) . 4 
The majority did note, in passing, the de-
cision of the Washington Supreme Court in State 
ex rel. Schillberg v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 75 
Wash. 2d 339, 450 P.2d 949 (1969), that the 
mere act of visiting a store constituted suffi-
cient consideration to create an unlawful trans-
action. 29 Utah 2d at 455. However, the major-
ity nowhere stated that this was the law of 
Utah. Because plaintiffs had alleged the exis-
tence of a contract, and thus consideration, 
4For reasons which are not immediately clear from exam-
ination of the record and briefs, Conoco did not simply deny 
the existence of a contract. The denial would have been well-
founded; a game such as Double Cash Bingo does not create an 
enforceable contract. The awarding of prizes is purely gratu-
itous. A participant in Double Cash Bingo bases his expecta-
tion of a return not upon an enforceable legal obligation by 
Albertson's, but upon Albertson's' reputation for honest deal-
ing and upon the enormous importance of maintaining that kind of 
reputation. Stated simply, Albertson's does not pay prizes 
under duress of law; it does so under duress of conscience 
and obvious sound business judf,ment. 
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that question was moot. 5 
B. The rule, attributed by defendants to 
the Geis decision, that such inconsequential 
matters as the time, attention, thought, energy 
and possible cost of transportation which are 
involved in a promotional game could constitute 
"valuable consideration" is unsound and should 
be disavowed by this Court. As has been demon-
strated in prior sections of this brief, Part 
11 has removed promotional games such as Double 
Cash Bingo from the criminal prohibition against 
gambling and lotteries by means of the "lawful 
business transaction" exemption and further has 
limited the term "valuable consideration" as 
5Even if the majority had made a statement of Utah law, 
that statement would have been dictum only. A court's noting 
a concession of counsel cannot be deemed a holding. Peoule v 
Levine, 161 Misc. 336, 291 NYS 1001 (1936); Lusk v. Seal, 12~ 
Miss. 228, 91 So. 386 (1922). Further, this Court held in 
Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comrn'n, 73 Utah 199, 205, 273 Pac 
306 (1929): 
It may be said that dictum is one of two kinds--
one, the expression of an opinion by the court or a 
judge of a mere collateral question not involved or 
of mere argument or illustration ... not argued or 
briefed by counsel . . . . 
Accord, State v. Salt Lake County, 96 Utah 464, 479, 85 P.2d 
851 (1938) ("Court decisions are authoritative only upon 
questions of law or fact actually presented ... "). 
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used therein to include only items of discern-
ible monetary value. Therefore, even if the 
Court had held in Geis that participation in 
a lottery similar to Double Cash Bingo was un-
lawful under the former statute, that decision 
would be inapplicable to Part 11. However, 
the interpretation of "valuable consideration" 
which was urged upon the District Court by 
defendants herein would be unsound under any 
statutory scheme and should be rejected. 
As was mentioned in Geis, the Washirrgton 
Supreme Court held in State ex rel. Schillberg 
v. Safewav Stores, Inc., supra, that the mere 
act of going to a store to pick up a game card 
constituted sufficiently "valuable considera-
tion" to make that game an unlawful lottery. 
Such an interpretation flies in the face of 
common sense and has been rejected by one jur-
isdiction after another. The Oregon Supreme 
Court in Cudd v. Aschenbrenner, 233 Or. 272, 
377 P.2d 150, 158-159 (1962), upholding a pro-
motional game similar to Double Cash Bingo, 
held: 
[No one could be rendered poor by par-
ticipating in the plaintiffs' drawings. 
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The worst that could happen to anyone 
would be that he would buy some gro-
ceries. But, if he purchased any, he 
would do so not in order to qualify 
himself as a participant in the draw-
ing- -for participation was free--but 
voluntarily. His purchase would not 
enhance in the slightest degree his 
chances upon the drawings. Participa-
tion in the drawings could not become 
for him a gambling tendency. There 
was nothing that anyone could do that 
would improve his prospects of winning. 
. . . In order to participate in the 
drawings it was not necessary for any-
one to spend a nickel in the store or 
in any other place. Tickets for the 
drawings and tickets to the parking 
lot (where the drawings occurred) were 
not for sale. They were free. Anyone 
who wished to do so could enter the 
parking lot and watch, free of charge, 
the drawings take place. This promo-
tional scheme is a mere means of draw-
ing customers to the plaintiffs' 
stores .... The scheme is not a lottery 
although the prize money is distributed 
by chance. It is not a lottery because 
there is no consideration which is in 
any way harmful to the participant. 
The participant parts with nothing of 
any value to himself. [Emphasis added.] 
Similarly, the Court of Appeals held in People 
v. Cardas, supra, 28 P.2d 99, 100 (1933): 
Counsel for the people argue that pa-
tronage from the ticket holders as a 
whole constituted consideration for 
the distribution of the prizes, even 
though the individual holders of tick-
ets had not parted with consideration 
for the individual ticket held by them. 
This argument apparently proceeds upon 
the theory that the element of consid-
eration is established by showing that 
the defendant received something of 
value in return for the distribution 
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of the prizes. The question of con-
sideration is not to be determined 
from the standpoint of the defendant, 
but from that of the holders of prize 
tickets. The question is: Did the 
holders of prize tickets pay a valu-
able consideration for the chance? 
Certainly those who received prize 
tickets without buying an admission 
ticket did not pay anything for the 
chance of getting the prize. They 
did not hazard anything of value. 
[Emphasis added.] 
Accord, State v. Eames, 87 N.H. 477, 183 Atl. 
590' 592 (1936). 
Numerous jurisdictions have refused to find 
"such slight detriment as that necessary to par-
ticipate in [a] drawing" to constitute "valuable 
consideration" for purposes of a gambling statute. ~-, 
State ex rel. Stafford v. Fox-Great Falls Theatre 
Corp. , supra, 132 P. 2d at 696-697. It is the 
rule of the great majority of the jurisdictions 
which have considered the question that "valuable 
consideration" must be something of discernible 
pecuniary value. ~' People v. Eagle Food Cen-
ters, Inc., 31 Ill. 2d 535, 202 N.E.2d 473, 476 
(1964); Albert Lea Amusement Co. v. Elmwood 
Amusement Corp. , 231 Minn. 401, 43 N. H. 2d 2Li-9, 
254 (1950); Darlington Theatres v. Coker, supra; 
Affiliated Enterprises, Inc. v. Rock-Ola Mfs. 
Corp., supra. The majority rule makes vastly 
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more sense than does Schillberg. The major-
ity should be followed by Utah. 
4. Double Cash Bingo is not a criminal act by reason 
of the terms of Article VI, Section 28 of the Utah Constitu-
tion. 
vides: 
Article VI, Section 28 of the Utah Constitution pro-
The Legislature shall not authorize any 
game of chance, lottery or gift enterprise 
under any pretense or for any purpose. 
Section 28 prohibits only acts by the Legislature; it does 
not prohibit acts by private parties, much less make private 
parties' acts criminal. (Those portions of the Constitution 
which prohibit acts by private parties--~., Article XII, 
§§5, 7, 9, 10, 13, 16, 19 and 20--are specific in addressing 
themselves to private parties; Sections 19 and 20 specifi-
cally create a criminal sanction.) Authorization of a lot-
tery is not at issue in this case. The question before the 
Court is whether plaintiff's game is a crime. 
It is clear that Article VI, Section 28 was intended 
only to prohibit the creation of a public lottery. State 
lotteries had led to serious scandals in other states during 
the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The Article's 
purpose is clear from the debate in the Constitutional Con-
vention: 
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Mr. VAI;i HOR_WE. Mr. President, I hope that 
article will not go out . . . . But we know by 
common report that there were a million and a 
half dollars in the hands of men besieging the 
legislature of North Dakota to grant the fran-
chise for a lottery. A great deal has been 
said about the necessity of our putting guards 
around the Legislature for their future action 
in matters that have not the magnitude that 
that would have. It seems to me that it would 
be well to leave in the Constitution a orohibi-
tion against granting a franchise that common 
consent of the country holds to be an immoral 
franchise and detrimental to the public good. 
I hope the section will not be stricken out. 
Mr. EVANS (Weber). Mr. President, I am 
entirely opposed to the striking out of this 
section. . . . I believe that we ought to put 
an inhibition upon the Legislature to permit 
a thing of this kind. My friend from Salt -Lake 
says the Legislature cannot be bamboozled into 
granting such a franchise. I say let us make 
a prohibition in the Constitution so that they 
will not even consider the question at all. 
Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, p. 937, April 
12, 1895. 
II. 
THE APPLICABLE GA.M'3LING STATUTE IS VOID FOR 
VAGUENESS. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1101 (1) defines "gambling" as 
"risking anything of value for a return or . . . upon the out-
come of a contest, game, [etc.] ... when the return or out-
come is based upon an element of chance .... " Obviously, 
every event in life is based upon an "element of chance", 
but the statute provides no guidance as to what is the requi-
site "element of chance" which will render a transaction crim-
inal. 
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A statute which forbids an act in terms so vague that 
men of ordinary intelligence must guess at its meaning vio-
lates the due process guarantees of Section 1 of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
and Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah. Basin 
Flying Services, Inc. v. Public Service Comm'n, 531 P.2d 
1303, 1305 (Utah 1975). This Court stated in State v. Pack-
ard, 122 Utah 369, 375, 250 P.2d 561 (1952): 
[T]here is no disagreement among the courts that 
where a rule is set up, the violation of which 
subjects one to criminal punishment, the restric-
tions upon conduct should be described with suf-
ficient certainty, so that persons of ordinary 
intelligence, desiring to obey the law, may know 
how to govern themselves in conformity with it, 
and that no one should be compelled at the peril 
of life, liberty or property, to speculate as to 
the meaning of penal statutes. 
Part 11 fails to meet the test which the Packard decision 
imposes. 
CONCLUSION 
Double Cash Bingo is not "gambling" or a "lottery" 
withing the terms of the present Utah Penal Code. Even if 
it were within that Code's reach, the present gambling 
statute is unconstitutionally vague and unenforceable 
against appellant. The judgment of the Court below should 
be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this 25th day of Hay, 1978. 
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A P P E N D I X 
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THE CONSTITUTION 
OF 
THE UNITED STATES 
Amendment XIV, Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State where-
in they reside. No State shall make or enforce any 
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
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THE CONSTITUTION 
OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Article I, Section 7. 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law. 
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THE CONSTITUTION 
OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Article VI, Section 28. 
The Legislature shall not authorize any 
game of chance, lottery or gift enterprise under 
any pretense or for any purpose. 
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UTAH CODE ANN. §76-27-1 
(1953) 
GAMING 
Operation a felony.--Seizure and destruction 
of paraphernalia.--Every person who deals or carries 
on, opens or causes to be opened, or who conducts, 
either as owner or employee, whether for hire or not, 
any game of faro, monte, roulette, lansquenet, rouge 
et noir, rondo, or any game played with cards, dice 
or any other device, for money, checks, credit or 
any other representative of value is guilty of a fel-
ony, and it shall be the duty of all sheriffs, con-
stables, police and other peace officers whenever it 
shall come to the knowledge of such officer that any 
person has in his possession any cards, tables, 
checks, balls, wheels, slot machines or gambling de-
vices of any nature or kind whatsoever used or kept 
for the purpose of playing for money, or for tokens 
redeemable in money, at any of the games mentioned in 
this chapter, or that any cards, tables, checks, balls 
wheels, slot machines or gambling devices used or 
kept for the purposes aforesaid may be found in any 
place, to seize and take such cards, tables, checks, 
balls, wheels, slot machines or other gambling de-
vices, and convey the same before a magistrate of the 
county in which such devices shall be found; and it 
shall be the duty of such magistrate to inquire of 
such witnesses as he shall summon or as may appear 
before him in that behalf touching the nature of such 
gambling devices, and, if such magistrate shall de-
termine that the same are used or kept for the pur-
pose of being used at any game or games of chance 
described in this chapter, it shall be his duty to 
destroy the same. 
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UTAH CODE ANN. §76-27-9 
(1953) 
"Lottery" defined.--A lottery is any 
scheme for the disposal or distribution of prop-
erty by chance among persons who have paid or 
promised to pay any valuable consideration for 
the chance of obtaining such property or a por-
tion of it, or for any share of any interest in 
such property, upon any agreement, understanding 
or expectation that it is to be distributed or 
disposed of by lot or chance, whether called a 
lottery, raffle or gift enterprise, or by what-
ever name the same may be known. 
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UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1101 
(1977 Supp.) 
Definitions.--For purposes of this part: 
(1) "Gambling" means risking anything of 
value for a return or risking anything of value 
upon the outcome of a contest, game, gaming scheme, 
or gaming device when the return or outcome is 
based upon an element of chance and is in accord 
with an agreement or understanding that someone 
will receive something of value in the event of a 
certain outcome, and gambling includes a lottery; 
gambling does not include: 
(a) A lawful business transaction, or 
(b) Playing an amusement device that con-
fers only an immediate and unrecorded right of re-
play not exchangeable for value. 
(2) "Lottery" means any scheme for the 
disposal or distribution of property by chance 
among persons who have paid or promised to pay any 
valuable consideration for the chance of obtaining 
property, or portion of it, or for any share or 
any interest in property, upon any agreement, un-
derstanding, or expectation that it is to be dis-
tributed or disposed of by lot or chance, whether 
called a lottery, raffle, or gift enterprise, or 
by whatever name it may be known. 
(3) "Gambling bet" means money, checks, 
credit, or any other representation of value. 
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